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Abstract 
Loan loss reserves make up an essential part of a bank’s soundness and more generally its 
viability. An under-provisioned reserve account implies that capital ratios may overstate a bank’s 
ability to absorb future losses. For this reason, both supervisory authorities and investors regularly 
assess the adequacy of the loan loss provisions alongside the more popular capital ratios. The aim 
of the paper is to identify what motivates the loss provisioning policies employed by Belgian banks, 
especially whether banks use provisioning to inter-temporally smooth their earnings or capital 
positions. Owing to the relatively long data series, the paper also investigates whether the 
introduction of the IAS-39 "incurred loss" accounting standards or the onset of the financial crisis in 
2008/9 had any impact on the provisioning decisions. The results show that provisioning practices 
of Belgian banks have been rather tightly linked to future losses, although the relationship has 
weakened considerably after the introduction of the IAS-39 standards and, to a lesser extent, after 
the financial crisis. There is also evidence that Belgian banks might have used provisioning 
decisions to manage their current earnings and to some extent to signal future profitability, although 
the latter motive also appears to have weakened after the introduction of IAS-39 standards. 
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION1 
The 2008/9 financial crisis has led to a deep debate among the banking industry players, regulators 
and accounting specialists on whether the international accounting standards need to be revised to 
provide investors a more realistic view of a bank’s assets, liabilities and profitability. A key topic of 
discussion has been the adequacy of loan loss reserves2. Much like capital reserves, loan loss 
reserves aim at absorbing future losses that a bank may face. However, loan loss reserves are 
meant to be maintained to absorb expected losses while the minimum capital requirements aim at 
absorbing unexpected losses.  
The primary motivation of this study is to identify what factors have driven the provisioning policies 
of Belgian banks in recent years. Owing to the relatively long history of the supervisory monitoring 
data set used in the study, the paper pays close attention to the evolution of provisioning practices 
in response to the introduction of the IAS-39 as well as following the onset of the financial crisis. 
The study in particular aims to understand the factors that may be determining provisioning 
decisions.  
What makes these research aims feasible is the fact that the supervisory data used in the study is 
reported under the Belgian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (BGAAP). Under BGAAP, 
banks have been granted substantial freedom over their provisioning practices. In particular, banks 
can set aside reserves for exposures that are classified by the bank to be “non-recoverable", or 
those for which there is sufficient evidence that debtors will be unable to honour their credit 
obligations. In addition, banks can also establish loss reserves for loans with “uncertain outcomes” 
as long as there is some probability that the debtor or a group of debtors will face difficulties. In 
either case, the identification methods and the standards of evidence that need to be met for 
classifying exposures under either category are left almost entirely to the discretion of the bank.  
In contrast, the international accounting standards that were developed in early 2000s (or the so-
called "IAS-39 standards")3 provide less discretion to banks. Banks can provision only in response 
to events that have already occurred, or only after there is objective of some “incurred losses”. The 
standards provide substantial detail on the events that are acceptable as the basis of provisioning.4 
Losses due to anticipated future events, no matter how likely they may be, cannot be recognized. 
In many cases, the result is that a bank can only set aside reserves for loans that are past-due (i.e. 
non-performing) but cannot do the same for loans that are expected to become past-due in a future 
period.  
The aim for developing the IAS-39 standards was to limit the possibility of using provisioning for 
any other purpose than absorbing future losses. When a bank sets aside provisions, it effectively 
reduces the (net) value of the corresponding loans on its balance sheet, which in turn lowers its 
                                                   
1 See Arbak (2016) for a more concise description of the various problem loan categories, including loan 
loss reserves, and some of the high-level results developed in this paper.  
2 In the rest of text, loan loss reserves refer to the stock of provisions, which are determined in each 
accounting period. The term “provisioning” is used to refer to these choices by the banks. In turn, the term 
“loan loss reserves” is used to refer to the capacity of a bank to absorb future losses.  
3 The IAS-39 standards were endorsed in the EU by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2086/2004 of 19 
November 2004, henceforth (“EU Regulation”). The EU-version included two exceptions to the 
international standard: the fair-value option and hedge accounting carve outs. The first exception excluded 
own debt from the scope of the “full fair-value option”, which was resolved through Commission Regulation 
(EC) No. 1864/2005. The second exception, which continues to be in effect, allows EU entities to qualify a 
broader category of portfolio (i.e. macro) hedges under hedge accounting. 
4 In particular, the specific events that can be recognized include “significant financial difficulty of the 
issuer…; a breach of contract…;borrower [entering] bankruptcy…; disappearance of an active market for 
that financial asset…; observable data indicating … a measurable decrease in estimated future cash 
flows…”, (IAS-39.59). 
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equity position.5 Thus, a bank with a particularly low capital position may be deterred from 
provisioning in order to avoid falling foul of the regulatory minima or the market's expectations. In 
some jurisdictions, part of the provisioned amounts may be recognized as regulatory capital, which 
may have an offsetting impact. In addition, the newly provisioned amounts also appear as an 
expense item in the profit and loss account. A bank thus has the ability to reverse these reserves in 
the future, allowing the allocation of profits between different periods. Thus, managers that aim at 
achieving a certain level of profitability may use provisioning to hit that target if their pre-
provisioning income is insufficient.  
In short, when banks have full discretion over their provisioning choices, those may be partly 
determined by their motivation to manage their earnings or capital positions. The incurred loss 
approach simply reduces this discretion by instructing banks to incorporate only losses arising from 
reduced cash flows due to the incurred loss event.6  
Although it constrains the ability of banks to exercise an undue amount of discretion, the incurred 
loss approach also has some disadvantages. A key concern relates to potential pro-cyclicality.7 
More specifically, since provisioning decisions under IAS-39 are to a large extent backward-
looking, loan loss reserves may not be adequately built in advance during down-turns, (Laeven & 
Majnoni, 2003; Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008; 2012). Under-provisioning may also make it more costly 
for troubled banks to remove the distressed loans from their balance sheets in later stages of 
down-turns, which is identified as a potential driver of low credit growth in certain European 
countries in recent years, (Aiyar et al., 2015). If loan loss reserves are systematically inadequate to 
absorb the expected losses, even a well-capitalized bank may find itself in severe distress. 
Moreover, the pro-cyclicality of provisioning may further amplify the self-perpetuating relationship 
between lending standards, loan growth, and economic activity, (Berger & Udell, 2004; Dell'Ariccia 
& Marquez, 2006; Foos et al., 2010).  
These concerns have led the world leaders at the G-20 London summit in April 2009 to call for “the 
accounting standard setters to work urgently with supervisors and regulators to improve standards 
on valuation and provisioning and achieve a single set of high-quality global accounting standards”. 
The resulting new international accounting standards for financial instruments (or, the so-called 
“IFRS 9 rules) allow banks to use a much broader set of information to estimate expected credit 
losses than the current IAS 39 rules, including not only past and current evidence but also future 
information. In doing so, the new standards also eliminate the heavy reliance on incurred losses 
but introduces other risk categories where expected credit losses can be recognized. In the EU, the 
IFRS 9 standards will be phased-in gradually, starting from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023.8 
                                                   
5 Depending on the accounting treatment, loan loss reserves may appear as a liability or as a “contra-asset” 
in an institution’s financial report. As an example, under the Belgian Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (B-GAAP) rules, certain types of reserves (i.e. “uncertain loans”) appear as liabilities, effectively 
offsetting the amounts lent. In turn, under the IAS-39 rules the reserves for other types of impaired assets 
(i.e. “non-recoverable loans”) may be directly incorporated into the carrying amount of those assets without 
the use of an allowance account on the liabilities. 
6 The IAS-39 rules state that “the amount of the loss is measured as the difference between the asset's 
carrying amount and the present value of estimated future cash flows (excluding future credit losses that 
have not been incurred) discounted at the financial asset's original effective interest rate (i.e. the effective 
interest rate computed at initial recognition),” (IAS 39.63). 
7 In the context of provisioning, pro-cyclicality refers to the fact that the amount of loan loss reserves that 
banks accumulate may be positively correlated with the underlying credit quality.  
8 The IFRS-9 standards were adopted in the EU under the Commission Regulation (EC) No 2016/2067, 
which entered into force in November 2016. As part of its CRR/CRDIV revisions issued at the same time, 
the European Commission introduced a 5-year phasing in period for the new standards, starting from 1 
January. For a more detailed description of how the IFRS-9 standards may impact banks, see Arbak 
(2016). 
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This study relies on the unconsolidated supervisory data based on local BGAAP reporting rules, 
covering the years 1999 to 2014. Owing to the relatively long historical series, the study focuses on 
the factors that may be driving the provisioning decisions of banks. In particular, the study pays 
close attention to whether the introduction of the IAS-39 rules or the financial crisis has changed 
the importance of these factors.  
Belgian credit institutions that report on a consolidated basis have gradually adopted the IAS-39 
standards for their consolidated financial reports within a period over 2004 to 2006. Listed credit 
institutions had to adopt the regulation by January 2005 for their consolidated reports. The non-
listed credit institutions were allowed to withhold the adoption of the standards up until January 
2006. Several Belgian institutions opted to adopt the rules at an earlier date than these dates, 
including a major listed bank that published its first IAS-compliant consolidated report on January 
2004.9  
The paper aims to exploit the fact that the Belgian banks have a choice over their provisioning 
approaches at the unconsolidated level. Unlike the IAS-39 rules, BGAAP allows banks to opt for or 
against the incurred loss approach for their unconsolidated reporting.10 The identification strategy 
hinges on the fact that some banks may have implemented rules that are similar to IAS-39 rules for 
their unconsolidated reporting while others may use the flexibility afforded in BGAAP to continue 
with their pre-IAS-39 approach.  
This study differs from other studies in a number of ways. First, it relies on a longer time-series, 
covering the years between 1999 and 2014. Second, it incorporates competing explanations for 
provisioning practices of banks. Most of the literature, on the other hand, focuses on a single or a 
set of complementary explanations such as earnings or capital management, economic cycles, 
backward or forward-looking orientation, and so forth. Lastly, the supervisory reports are based on 
a uniform accounting standard (BGAAP), which allows the identification of the impact of the regime 
changes.  
The results of the study are informative for a variety of reasons. First, they shed light on what 
motivates the loss provisioning policies employed by Belgian banks. Moreover, they allow an 
assessment of whether the implementation of the IAS-39 incurred-loss rules or the recent financial 
crisis has led to a shift in provisioning practices. A key question that the paper seeks to answer is 
whether the banks effectively use provisioning policies to achieve their primary purpose, to 
accumulate reserves to absorb future expected losses. Lastly, the findings may also be informative 
on what type of changes that Belgian banks may face when the harmonized accounting rules will 
soon be replaced by the IFRS-9 forward-looking "expected loss" approach.11  
  
                                                   
9 For more information on the implementation of IAS/IFRS rules in European banking, see Ernst & Young 
(2006). 
10 The general standards relating to Belgian GAAP are defined by the Royal Decree of 23 September 1992 
on the annual accounts of credit institutions, Articles 19 and 35.  
11 The new rules were developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and were 
published in July 2014.  
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2 RELATED LITERATURE ON EXPLANATORY FACTORS OF PROVISIONING  
2.1 Provisioning to manage earnings or capital positions 
There are several reasons why provisioning decisions may be determined by a bank's earnings, 
regulatory capital, or even its tax liabilities. Provisions are booked as expenses and thus lower the 
firm's profits and, assuming that losses from provisioning are tax deductible, its tax liabilities.12 
Managers may thus use provisioning to manage inter-temporally its publicly disclosed profits. With 
regards to capital, higher provisioning often lowers retained earnings and thus regulatory capital. In 
parallel, increasing loan loss reserves lowers the book value of the bank's total assets and thereby 
worsens its equity position. In turn, ever since the introduction of Basel I regulatory capital 
standards, a part of loan loss reserves can be recognized as regulatory capital, which could offset 
some of these negative impacts.13   
Since provisioning has an impact on earnings, capital positions and tax liabilities, a bank’s 
managers may want to use it to meet multiple ends. Provisioning decisions may be used to smooth 
the volatility in earnings or capital ratios since these measures are often perceived as measures of 
risk, (Dye, 1988; Barth et al., 1999). Similarly, they can be used to meet the market expectations in 
earnings or the lower cost of capital at times when funding conditions tighten, (Scholes et al., 
1990). Managers may be motivated to use provisioning to attain specific earnings targets or capital 
ratios to smooth their managerial pay over business cycle, (Degeorge et al., 1999; Koch & Wall, 
2000). Amassing reserves when earnings are high can be a way for “saving for a rainy day” 
(Greenawalt & Sinkey, 1988). Ample reserves may signal financial health and may contribute to 
higher future earnings through lower cost of capital, (Beaver et al., 1989; Wahlen, 1994; Beaver & 
Engel, 1996). Managers may use any discretion they may have to "window-dress" the bank's public 
accounts with the use of provisioning reversals (i.e. negative provisioning) to improve the earnings 
or capital positions artificially, (Yasuda et al., 2004). Managers may also choose to delay 
provisioning when pre-provisioning profits are negative to benefit from lower future tax liabilities 
when things improve. If any of these motives weigh sufficiently heavily, provisioning decisions 
would exhibit a significant positive correlation with the bank's net earnings and capital ratios.  
The correlation between the earnings and capital positions on the one hand and the provision 
decisions on the other may also be due to factors that are beyond the direct control of managers. 
Most notably, lower net earnings and capital positions often indicate the presence or the build-up of 
underlying risks, which may lead to increased provisioning. Managers may also face increased 
investor or supervisory pressure to provision more at those moments, (Laeven & Majnoni 2003). 
Similarly, the introduction of introduction of international accounting standards (IAS-39) could 
reduce managers' discretion and may offset these relationships, (Ashbaugh & Pincus, 2001).   
Empirical evidence generally supports the idea that earnings management is an important motive 
in provisioning decisions when the managers can exercise discretion over their provisioning 
                                                   
12 Belgian tax law allows specific loan loss provisions to be tax deductible as long as the bank can provide 
evidence that the losses have already incurred. 
13 Under the 1988 Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), banks were allowed to include loan loss reserves created 
against the possibility of losses not yet identified, i.e. “general reserves”, under Tier-2 capital up to a 
maximum of 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. Provisions linked to future expected losses due to 
deterioration on particular exposures, i.e. "specific reserves", had to be excluded from regulatory capital. 
With the implementation of the revised Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) rules, these rules continued to be 
applicable for banks using the standardized approach for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements 
for credit risk. For banks that opt for the internal ratings based method (IRB) for the calculation of capital 
requirements, the recognition of reserves in regulatory capital depends on the extent that the former 
covers for the model-based estimates for expected losses (EL). Shortfalls are deducted from Tier-1 and 
Tier-2 capital on an equal-basis (50%-50%). Excesses may be recognized in Tier-2 capital only up to a 
maximum of 0.6% of risk-weighted assets. These provisions were left unchanged under the more recent 
(Basel III) standards. 
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decisions.14 Indeed, most of the earlier evidence, based on US data, shows that current and past 
earnings are a significant determinant of loan loss provisions in the banking sector, (Greenawalt & 
Sinkey, 1988; Ma, 1988; Scholes et al., 1990; Collins et al., 1995; Kim & Kross, 1998).15 More 
recent research provides a more conditional support to the idea of earnings management with the 
use of more detailed accounting data, (Anandarajan et al., 2003; Perez et al., 2011), and cross-
country comparisons, (Hasan & Wall, 2004; Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005; Bouvatier & Lepetit, 
2008; Leventis et al., 2011). A common finding in these more recent studies is that while managers 
may have the ability use provisioning to smooth their earnings in good years, the relationship may 
turn negative for banks facing poor results, highlighting varying levels of discretion available to the 
management. Indeed, Ahmed et al. (1999) show that the earnings management plays a role only in 
the determination of non-discretionary provisions (i.e. current and past non-performing loans) and 
not over the total provisioning decisions, which may be suggesting that a third factor (i.e. economic 
conditions) that influences both variables may be driving the results. 
The evidence on the impact of the IAS-39 on the use of earnings management is mixed.16 Ball et 
al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards is one of the necessary conditions for 
ensuring the availability of high quality public information to investors, but that it cannot alone be 
sufficient. Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2005) provide evidence that German firms (including both 
financial and non-financial entities) adopting the international norms on a voluntary basis exhibited 
similar earnings management behavior as others. In turn, Barth et  al. (2008) use an international 
sample of financial and non-financial institutions to show that the adoption of international norms 
has lowered the use of earnings management. More recently, Leventis et al. (2011) and Gebhardt 
& Novotny-Farkas (2011) found evidence that the adoption of IAS-39 standards has reduced 
earnings management practices for EU banks.  
Unlike earnings management, the empirical evidence on the use of provisioning to manage capital 
ratios is much less convincing. Although certain studies that rely on find some evidence, (Moyer, 
1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Wall & Koch, 2000; Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008), more 
recent studies fail to provide any statistical evidence, (Collins et al., 1995; Hasan & Wall, 2004; 
Leventis et al., 2011). The lack of a relationship may be explained by the fact that loan loss 
reserves are only partly considered to be part of regulatory capital. The mixed panel results may 
also be due to the non-linear nature of the relationship between capital and provisioning. Indeed, 
Hasan & Wall (2004) find that loan loss allowances and capital ratios posit a negative relationship, 
which could reflect the need for poorly capitalised banks to set aside more provisions, possibly due 
to market or supervisory pressure.  
2.2 Cyclical components of provisioning 
As already noted above, economic conditions often have a strong impact on credit risks. It would 
therefore be natural to have a pro-cyclical component in provisioning decisions if banks respond to 
                                                   
14 Not all studies find earnings management to be significant determinant of loan loss provisioning. Using a 
US bank sample, Beatty et al. (1995) fail to find any evidence of income smoothing and suggest that the 
link between loan loss provisioning and earnings could be weakened once other simultaneously 
determined accrual decisions, such as write-offs, loss recognition and asset sales, are accounted for.  
15 Several US-based studies have also confirmed that provisioning decisions may be used to signal financial 
strength, (Liu & Ryan, 1995; Beaver & Engel, 1996; Liu et al., 1997). Other studies, including Ahmed et al. 
(1999) for US banks and Anandarajan et al. (2003) for Spanish banks find no evidence of signaling.  
16 Not all studies support the idea that IFRS reduced the opportunities for earnings management. In 
particular, Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2005) provide evidence that German firms (including both 
financial and non-financial entities) that adopted the international norms on a voluntary basis exhibited 
similar earnings management behavior as others. The authors argue that high quality standards may not 
be fully effective if they are not complemented by equally strong investor protection rights. Similarly, Ball et 
al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards is one of the necessary conditions for ensuring the 
availability of high quality public information to investors, but that it cannot alone be sufficient. 
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any build-up of such risks. Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) confirms that there is a negative 
relationship between provisioning and real GDP growth, even if the relationship is weakened by 
income smoothing, or as banks provision less in bad times to maintain their income measures. 
Pain (2003) shows that the provisioning decisions of major UK banks are also positively correlated 
with real interest rates as well as lagged aggregate lending. Other studies provide evidence that 
banks provision more the deeper they are into an economic downturn, (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003; 
Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008; 2012). Banks may also choose to provision more during good times by 
taking account of the building-up of credit risks as excessive credit growth outpaces their ability to 
properly monitor creditworthiness and service debt, (Borio et al., 2001; Borio & Lowe, 2001). The 
dynamic provisioning rules that currently are in place in Spain, Portugal and some other Latin 
American countries favor this alternative – i.e. counter-cyclical – approach, requiring banks to hold 
more reserves as credit growth surges, (Saurina, 2009).  
Pro-cyclicality can also arise if provisioning decisions are backward-looking. Indeed, as noted 
above the “incurred loss model” of the IAS-39 prescribes banks to increase provisions only when 
they experience specific stress events. Since those events are more likely to occur during macro-
economic down-turns, aggregate provisioning is likely to be pro-cyclical under IAS-39. Possibly 
owing to the prevalence of IAS-39 rules, most empirical studies confirm the significance of 
backward-looking parameters as explanatory factors.  
2.3 Provisioning to absorb expected future losses 
Finally, banks may be more forward-looking in assessing any potential changes in credit quality 
and increase their LLP (loan loss provision) ratios in anticipation of potential future losses. The 
empirical literature mainly focuses on the extent to which provisioning decisions are timely, 
occurring before the problem loans start amassing. While these studies do not specifically focus on 
whether provisioning decisions are correlated with forward-looking estimates, there is evidence of a 
lower degree of pro-cyclical lending for banks with relatively timelier provisioning (Beatty & Liao, 
2011). Another focus has been the impact of various accounting standards on the measured 
timeliness of provisioning decisions. There are mixed results on whether the IAS-39 standards 
have reduced the timeliness of provisioning decisions. O'Hanlon (2013) shows that the introduction 
of IAS-39 in the UK did not necessarily have a negative impact on the timeliness of provisioning.17 
In turn, Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas (2011) use a different measure of timeliness to find exactly the 
opposite result for a relatively large sample of European banks, including the UK banks. 
Interestingly, Illueca et al. (2012) find that the introduction of the Spanish dynamic loss provisioning 
rules in 2000, which preceded the IAS-39 standards, has led to increased risk-taking, particularly 
for banks that had a timelier provisioning prior to the new rules.  
  
                                                   
17 It is possible that the result is due to similarity of the UK GAAP to the IAS-39 regime on the treatment of 
loan losses. Indeed, among the possible explanations for their finding, O'Hanlon (2013) cites one of the 
expert testimonies before the House of Lords Committee inquiry on the potential impact of the new norms. 
The expert argued that “there is no major difference in the requirements of the SORP on Loans and 
Advances, which represents UK GAAP on the topic, and IAS-39 under IFRS: both are incurred loss 
models,” (p. 232). 
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3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The prior literature has taken only a subset of these factors as a basis for estimating loan 
provisioning, with some notable exceptions such as Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), Laeven & 
Majnoni (2003) and Bushman & Williams (2012). Unlike many other studies, this paper aims to 
explain provisioning decisions while accounting for various capital and income-management 
motives, cyclical macro-economic drivers, and, perhaps most importantly, forward-looking expected 
losses. The models will also control for the introduction of the IAS-39 and the onset of the financial 
crisis following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.  
This section provides an overview of the panel data and the model used in the study, with a 
particularly detailed exposition of how expected losses may enter into the current provisioning 
decisions.  
3.1 Data 
Table 1. Bank-specific descriptive statistics (1999 – 2014)  
 
Obs. Mean St. dev. Median 10th pct 90th pct 
 
Entire sample 
ܮܰ(ܶܣ) 326 22.38 2.17 22.22 19.99 25.79 
ܮܮܴ 325 1.81% 2.72% 1.05% 0.34% 2.85% 
οܮܮܴ 325 0.03% 0.44% 0.01% -0.21% 0.32% 
ܮܱܵܵ 325 0.22% 0.44% 0.08% 0.00% 0.63% 
ܧܤܶܲ 325 0.31% 0.40% 0.17% -0.01% 0.84% 
ܧܳܤܲ 326 6.65% 6.33% 5.47% 2.39% 9.54% 
 
IAS-39 banks 
ܮܰ(ܶܣ) 124 23.67 1.91 23.56 21.45 26.10 
ܮܮܴ 124 0.93% 0.53% 0.89% 0.24% 1.72% 
οܮܮܴ 124 0.00% 0.20% -0.01% -0.15% 0.16% 
ܮܱܵܵ 124 0.20% 0.31% 0.09% 0.02% 0.52% 
ܧܤܶܲ 124 0.30% 0.44% 0.16% -0.02% 0.77% 
ܧܳܤܲ 124 5.44% 2.23% 5.30% 2.45% 7.92% 
 
Post-crisis (2008) 
ܮܰ(ܶܣ) 149 22.67 2.08 22.58 20.14 26.00 
ܮܮܴ 148 1.88% 3.14% 0.98% 0.32% 2.85% 
οܮܮܴ 148 0.08% 0.56% 0.03% -0.21% 0.41% 
ܮܱܵܵ 148 0.24% 0.50% 0.09% 0.00% 0.67% 
ܧܤܶܲ 148 0.28% 0.41% 0.17% -0.03% 0.80% 
ܧܳܤܲ 149 6.55% 6.36% 5.50% 2.55% 8.94% 
 
Note: LN(TA) gives the log of total assets; ¨LLR is the first difference (annual) in loan loss reserves divided by 
total loans; LOSS gives the final losses on loans divided by total loans; EBTP is the earnings before taxes and 
provisioning are taken into account divided by total assets; EQBP is the equity before the impact of 
provisioning via retained earnings is taken into account, divided by total assets.  
 
The individual bank-level data are extracted from the unconsolidated supervisory reporting 
database (the so-called “Schema-A reports”) of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) covering the 
period 1999 and 2014 for a total of 25 Belgian credit institutions. Although the data is available on a 
quarterly basis, in many cases banks delay a big part of their annual provisioning decisions and 
charge-offs until the last quarter. To avoid any unnecessary seasonality, annual data was used in 
the paper. The supervisory data is based on the Belgian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(BGAAP), which gives reporting institutions substantial freedom over the provisioning practices. 
The reported loss provisions cover provisions on interbank loans as well as customer loans and 
receivables. The data was corrected for mergers and overtaking of lending activities. Where data 
availability was not an issue and the merger did not result in an artificial volatility (i.e. often-times 
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due to gradual transfer of activities), either pre- or post-merger data was used to maximize the 
sample size.  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics on the various indicators used in the study. LN(TA) is the 
log of total assets, which is used as an indicator of the size of each bank. LLR is the (annual) stock 
of loan loss reserves divided by total loans, which represents how much the bank has accumulated 
to absorb loan losses.¨LLR is the first difference of the loan loss reserves divided by total loans. 
As will be clarified below, the change in reserves, which is closely associated with provisioning 
levels, was used to keep the focus on the impact on profits and losses. LOSS gives the gross 
losses18 on loans divided by total loans, which will be modelled to investigate whether loss 
expectations may drive current provisioning decisions.19 EBTP is equivalent to the each bank's net 
income before taxes and provisioning divided by total assets, which will be used to account for any 
earnings-management or signaling motives. Lastly, EQBP is equivalent to each bank's net equity 
position before the impact of provisioning on retained earnings divided by total assets, which will be 
used to account for any capital-management motives. IAS-39 banks are those that were obliged by 
the EU Regulation to use those standards for their consolidated supervisory reports, but not 
necessarily for the unconsolidated reports.  
Banks on average set aside 0.03% of their gross loans to increase their loan loss reserves, 
representing less than one seventh of their write-off losses. In other words, for the sample as a 
whole, a single year's losses could be offset by seven years of provisioning accruals. In turn, the 
stock of loan loss reserves is sufficient to absorb around 9 years of losses on average, without any 
need of additional provisioning. The figures also show that the provisioning policies have clearly 
changed after the crisis, with banks needing around three years of provisioning accruals to offset 
their annual losses on average. Although these observations could be an evidence of how Belgian 
banks have changed their provisioning policies over time, the fact that the standard deviations are 
relatively high suggests that differences may well be explained by other factors.  
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the write-off losses and the loan loss reserves over time. It is clear 
that losses have increased substantially during three distinct periods: first in 2002, probably in 
response to the losses associated with the Dotcom bust of 2000/1; second in 2009/10, in the 
aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008; and lastly in 2013, possibly in response to the 
2011/2 Eurozone sovereign crisis.  
  
                                                   
18 NBB's Schema A reporting does not distinguish between losses arising from various types of derecognized 
assets, i.e. write-offs, write-downs (i.e. partial write-offs or debt relief as part of loan restructuring 
solutions), and asset sales. For the sake of brevity – and since asset sales are relatively rare in Belgium – 
all of these losses are referred to as write-off losses in the rest of the text.   
19 Due to unavailability of data, the losses on written-off loans were calculated by taking advantage of the 
double reporting of provisioning and changes in reserves on the balance sheets and on the profit and loss 
accounts. The gross value of written-off losses were calculated by subtracting the change in loan loss 
reserves as recorded on a bank’s balance sheet (i.e. equivalent to new provisioning minus reserves readily 
built for written-off loans) from the impact of these transactions on the profit and loss account (i.e. 
equivalent to new provisioning plus losses on written-off loans net of reserves readily built). Thus, the 
variable ܮܱܵܵ can be treated as a measure of the total haircut on the written-off loans since origination, i.e. 
without netting out the provisioned amounts.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of write-off losses and loan loss reserves (% of loans) 
 
Source: NBB, Schema-A reports 
 
3.2 Model 
We now provide a theoretical discussion of how banks build their loan loss reserves. In doing so, 
we introduce the relationship between provisions, future losses and other factors mentioned in the 
literature. We also highlight some of the empirical problems and the solutions associated with the 
identified model.  
We first assume that provisioning decisions are purely made with consideration of future losses. 
Thus, at any given point in time, a bank sets its loan loss reserves, ܮܮܴ௧, equal to the sum of its 
reserves that are earmarked to absorb a proportion of expected future losses that are written-
off,ܮܱܵ ௧ܵ:20  
ܮܮܴ௧ = σ ߛ௞ܧ௧ሾܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞]௞ஹଵ               (1)  
 
where ߛ௞ ൒ 0 determines the extent to which loan loss reserves are built to absorb the ݇-period 
forward-looking losses 21.  
This simple notational form22, and in particular the possibility that ߛ௞ < 1, allows for the fact that 
loan loss reserves may not be fully aligned with losses. In turn, the possibility that ߛ௞ ൐ ߛ௞ାଵ 
accounts for the fact that provisioning policies may be more sensitive to immediate losses than 
future losses. Putting these two together, a timely and adequate provisioning would imply 
sensitivities that are equivalent to or very close to unity. In turn, an adequate provisioning that is not 
timely, however, would imply that ߛଵ = 1 but rather quickly decreases with ݇. 
                                                   
20 Apart from the adjustments due to changing expectations, the loan loss reserve account is also adjusted in 
each period by mechanically removing reserves that have been accumulated for losses on loans that were 
derecognized (i.e. written-off or sold) in the current period. For more, see equation (3) below. 
21 In this characterization, the future risk sensitivity parameter, ߛ௞, also incorporates the discount rate. The 
results do not change if a uniform discount rate is assumed to be separate from the risk sensitivity 
parameter.  
22 A more accurate notation would highlight that the expectations are a function of the information set ȳ௧ 
available at time t. Note that individual bank subscripts are also dropped. A more complete formulation of 
the expectations would then be ܧሾܮܱܵ ௜ܵǡ௧ା௞ȁȳ௜ǡ௧]. These simplifications have been introduced to save 
space and simplify the exposition.  
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Beyond the loan loss provisions, banks may also fail to write-off bad loans in a timely or adequate 
manner. More broadly, a finding of timeliness or adequacy of provisioning may matter less if the 
write-offs are recognized with substantial delay or only partially. In other words, the yardstick that 
we use to assess provisioning may itself be biased. It should be noted however that both 
provisioning (that is the change in reserves) and write-offs lead to an identical impact on a bank’s 
profits. Indeed, in terms of their immediate impact on net incomes, both actions are substitutable.23 
Thus, a finding of timeliness or adequacy in one should in principle imply the timeliness or 
adequacy of another. Alternatively stated, if a bank chooses to write-off its loans late or only 
partially, it only makes sense for it to also provision for those losses in a similar manner.  
To keep the focus on the impact on profits, which is arguably what motivates most managers (i.e. 
earnings or capital management), the flow variable of change in loan loss reserves is considered 
as the endogenous variable in all models. Using equation (1), we can write the change in reserves 
as: 
 
οܮܮܴ௧ = {σ (ߛ௞ܧ௧[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞ሿ െ ߛ௞ܧ௧ିଵ[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵିଵା௞])௞ஹଵ }                                            (2) 
 
    = {σ (ߛ௞ܧ௧[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞ሿ െ ߛ௞ାଵܧ௧ିଵ[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞])௞ஹଵ }െ ߛଵܧ௧ିଵ[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵ].            (3) 
 
Although it will not be the basis of the models below, equation (3) is useful in identifying the 
mechanics of how loan loss reserves are built over time. In every period, a bank revises its total 
reserves due to incremental changes in expectations regarding losses for each future period. This 
revision, which is captured by the summation terms in curly brackets in equation (3), is necessary 
due to the arrival of new information regarding expected future losses. A positive term implies 
additional provisions are necessary, while a negative term would imply that reversals dominate. As 
noted above, the bank also mechanically removes the reserves that were deemed necessary for 
any current losses, which is captured by the negative term after the curly brackets.  
 
The forward-looking model24 above cannot be estimated directly since the expected future losses 
are latent variables. We thus substitute the expectations with the following forecast terms: 
 
ܧ௧[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞] = ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞ + ߟ௧,௧ା௞                       
 
where ߟ௧,௧ା௞  are the forecast errors, which are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed with a zero mean. Equation (2) can thus be simplified as: 
                                                   
23 One difference between provisioning and loss recognition is that the former can be reversed, implying a 
certain degree of flexibility and space for earnings or capital management. Losses that are recognized as 
write-offs in one period, however, cannot be reversed and can only be altered if the loss assessments 
made in the initial recognition change over time, for example due to changing recovery rates or changing 
collateral valuation.   
24 Equation (2) assumes an infinite-period forward-looking model and in doing so covers a number of finite-
period models. For example, one could assume that provisioning decisions do not take account of forward-
looking losses beyond ܭ periods  (myopia), ߛ௜ = 0 for all ݅ > ܭ.Another alternative is that current 
information cannot be used to estimate future losses beyond ܭ periods, (ܧ௧[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௄] = ܧ௧ିଵ[ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௄]).  
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οܮܮܴ௧ = σ ߛ௞οܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞௞ஹଵ + ߝ௧,                      (4)
 
where ߝ௧ = σ ߛ௞(ߟ௧,௧ା௞ െ ߟ௧ିଵ,௧ିଵା௞)௞ஹଵ  is the sensitivity-weighted changes in forecast errors.  
 
We now also consider that other factors, such as the earnings or capital management motives, 
earnings signaling, bank size, or macro-economic variables may also play a role in shaping 
provisioning decisions. In addition to bank size (Size), which his log of total assets, we use current 
earnings before taxes and provisioning shares (i.e. ܧܤܶ ௧ܲ) to control for the presence of earnings-
management motives. Similarly, each bank's net equity position before the impact of provisioning 
on retained earnings (i.e. ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ ) is used to account for any capital-management motives. One 
would expect these two factors to be positively related to provisioning decisions if the latter is used 
as to smooth results, meet the market expectations, attain internal profitability or capital targets, or 
to improve disclosed results. In turn, a negative coefficient would indicate higher provisioning 
needs arising from a build-up in underlying risks, possibly due to market pressure. We also use 
future earnings before taxes and provisioning shares (i.e. ܧܤܶ ௧ܲାଵ) to control for the presence of 
earnings signaling motives, where a high level of provisioning could be used to indicate (to outside 
investors) that future core profits will also be high. 
The macro-economic indicators include macro-economic variables of real GDP growth, short term 
interest rates measured by the 3-month Belgian treasury certificates (ST rate) and the spread 
between the ST rate and the 10-year Belgian government bond yield rate (LT spread). These 
variables are commonly used in most studies investigating the determinants of provisioning 
decisions of banks, often yielding a negative sign for real GDP growth and a positive sign for the 
interest rate measures.  
We also keep the forward-looking estimates limited to two years, implying that the banks provision 
today to account for potential losses that will happen up to two years ahead.25 Lastly, we allow for 
the possibility that provisioning may occur gradually and include lagged changes in loan loss 
reserves (οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ) as a right-hand side variable. As highlighted in equation (3), this variable also 
incorporates past-write offs, or the extent to which that provisioning decisions are backward-
looking.  
Lastly, we use interaction terms to investigate the impact of the crisis and the introduction of the 
IAS-39 standards on the key explanatory factors, including lagged changes in loan loss reserves 
(οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ), future losses (ܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଵ and ܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଶ), as well as variables accounting for earnings 
management, capital management, and earnings signaling motives (ܧܤܶ ௧ܲ,ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ, and ܧܤܶ ௧ܲାଵ, 
respectively).  
  
                                                   
25 Using a simplified model (i.e. regressing οܮܮܴ௧ on οܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞ for different number of forward-lags k), the 
optimal number of forward-lags is found to be 2 according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 1 
according to the Bayesian Schwarz information criterion (BIC). The results are robust to the small sample 
correction described in Hurvich & Tsai (1989). 
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With these specifications, the basic model to be estimated in the rest of the paper is: 
 
οܮܮܴ௧ = ܫܣܵ39 + ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ + ߚ ௧ܺ                                   (5)     +ߜଵଵοܮܮܴ௧ିଵ + ߜଵଶ × ܫܣܵ39 × οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ + ߜଵଷ × ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ൈ οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ          +ߛଵଵοܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଵ + ߛଵଶ × ܫܣܵ39 × οܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଵ + ߛଵଷ × ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ൈ οܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଵ   +ߛଶଵοܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଶ + ߛଶଶ × ܫܣܵ39 × οܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଶ + ߛଶଷ × ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ ൈ οܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଶ   +ߩଵଵܧܳܤ ௧ܲ + ߩଵଶ × ܫܣܵ39 × ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ + ߩଵଷ × ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ × ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ      +ߩଶଵܧܤܶ ௧ܲ + ߩଶଶ × ܫܣܵ39 × ܧܤܶ ௧ܲ + ߩଶଷ × ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ × ܧܤܶ ௧ܲ     +ߩଷଵܧܤܶ ௧ܲାଵ + ߩଷଶ × ܫܣܵ39 × ܧܤܶ ௧ܲାଵ + ߩଷଷ × ܥݎ݅ݏ݅ݏ × ܧܤܶ ௧ܲାଵ + ߝ௧  
 
where ௧ܺ is the vector of macro-economic and certain bank-specific variables comprising of Size, 
GDP growth, ST rate, and LT rate. 
 
Before outlining the estimation strategy in detail, it may be worthwhile to highlight several statistical 
attributes of equation (5) that make estimations less straight-forward. First, the error terms have 
intrinsic serial auto-correlation since both ߝ௧ and ߝ௧ିଵ contain the same forecast error terms, i.e. 
ߟ௧ିଵ,௧ା௞ . Second, one would expect the forward-looking error terms, ߟ௧,௧ା௞, to be negatively 
correlated with changes in future losses, οܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞.This is a natural outcome of our formulation 
since expected losses are by definition based on the current information set of the bank's 
managers.26 In addition, the amount of loan loss reserves built to absorb losses at any moment 
may constrain the losses deemed acceptable in the future, which could arise if managers aim to 
substantial net losses. Such a correlation would imply an under-estimation of the sensitivity 
parameters, ߛ௞. Third, once the cross-sectional heterogeneity is taken into account (i.e. by 
including a fixed-effect), the inclusion of the lagged provisioning term, οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ, as a right-hand side 
variable will lead to the well-known dynamic panel bias in the estimate of the lagged dependent 
variable coefficient,  (Nickell, 1981). 
We conduct three sets of analyses to estimate model (5). We first conduct a simple pooled OLS 
regression as a benchmark. Then, we conduct fixed-effects (FE) regressions to account for cross-
sectional heterogeneity and to ensure that the estimates are robust to the presence of bank-
specific and time-invariant omitted variables. Although the fixed-effects approach is a popular 
choice in the literature on loan loss provisioning, it does not take into account of dynamic panel 
bias, the potential endogeneity, error autocorrelation, or the possibility that the forecast errors ߟ௧,௧ା௞ 
may be correlated with future losses, ܮܱܵ ௧ܵା௞, which may lead to auto-correlation in the error terms 
in equation (5). More generally, neither approach attempts to model how expectations may be 
formed. To account for these, we lastly apply the system generalized method-of-moments (SYS-
GMM) estimation.  
                                                   
26 The forward-looking error term ߟ௧,௧ା௞ may also be correlated with current loses, ܮܱܵ ௧ܵ, since those may 
also determine future expectations. The correlation between the forward-looking error term and past losses 
is not of concern here since the latter are not directly included as right-hand side variables.  
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First proposed by Blundell & Bond (1998), SYS-GMM refines on the Arellano & Bond (1991) 
estimator. The latter method has been commonly employed to address dynamic panel bias and 
endogoneity via instrumental variables approach while accounting for unobserved individual 
specific heterogeneity by transforming the original model (i.e. in levels) into first differences. 
Sequential moment conditions are then introduced for each right-hand side variable that may 
exhibit a correlation with error terms. The instruments for these variables contain lagged values of 
the variable in question, as well as other variables that may be included as necessary. It has been 
demonstrated by Blundell & Bond (1998) that these so-called difference GMM estimations can 
have poor finite sample properties when the series display persistence. The SYS-GMM essentially 
adds more moment conditions to the system of equations by also considering level equations to 
account with these situations.  
Instruments for the SYS-GMM regressions are selected carefully to account for the dynamic panel 
bias, the inherent error autocorrelation and to model forward-looking expectations. In particular, the 
lagged endogenous variable (οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ) is instrumented by its second-order and third-order lags in 
order to take account of auto-correlation in error terms.27 A selection of macro-economic and 
financial variables from the prior period t-1 is also included as instruments on top of the usual set of 
exogenous variables within the model. The changes in future losses (οܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଵ on οܮܱܵ ௧ܵାଶ) are 
instrumented by their third-order lags. Once again, first-order differences of a selection of current 
macro-economic variables are included onto the usual set of instruments. The choices over the 
lags are driven to reflect the fact that forward-looking loss estimates are based on current or past 
data. The selection of optimal macro-economic instruments is done by choosing the model yielding 
the most preferable test statistics for over-identifying restrictions and residual autocorrelation.28   
  
                                                   
27 Including higher than third-order lags in general increased the likelihood of over-fitting and was thus 
avoided. 
28 Due to data availability issues, the list of candidate macro-economic variables were limited to real GDP 
growth, unemployment rate, Belgian house price index (obtained from International House Price Database 
of Federal Reserve of Dallas), BEL-20 stock market index, short-term interest rates, ST rate and the LT 
spread. 
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4 RESULTS 
The OLS regressions in Table 3 highlight that the introduction of the IAS-39 standards and the 
financial crisis are not statistically significant contributors to the bank’s provisioning decisions. 
Holding all else constant, bank size appears to have a relatively small negative impact on 
provisioning levels, although the statistical significance of the coefficient varies substantially from 
one model to another. In turn, GDP growth seems to robustly reduce provisioning while the long-
term interest spreads have the opposite impact, highlighting the important of the cyclical 
components. Short-term interest rate variable also has the expected sign, albeit with a relatively 
weak statistical significance.  
Table 3. Pooled (OLS) regression results for ǻLLR(t) 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
IAS-39 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Crisis -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Bank size -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) GDP growth -0.029* -0.027* -0.029* -0.027* -0.030** -0.027* -0.031** -0.028* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) ST rate 0.037 0.034 0.036* 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
LT spread 0.088* 0.086* 0.087* 0.080* 0.082 0.074 0.083 0.077 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.052) (0.048) (0.053) (0.050) 
ǻLLRt-1 0.019 -0.056 0.021 -0.074 0.043 -0.037 0.049 -0.044 
 (0.132) (0.116) (0.133) (0.107) (0.123) (0.095) (0.124) (0.086)   ... x IAS-39 -0.373*** -0.323** -0.379*** -0.322*** -0.336*** -0.286** -0.359*** -0.305*** 
 (0.112) (0.122) (0.113) (0.115) (0.116) (0.120) (0.103) (0.107) 
  ... x Crisis 0.402* 0.450** 0.400* 0.448*** 0.345 0.381*** 0.364* 0.407*** 
 (0.234) (0.171) (0.228) (0.149) (0.207) (0.125) (0.205) (0.122) 
ǻLOSSt+1 0.637*** 0.689*** 0.641*** 0.724*** 0.654*** 0.708*** 0.668*** 0.745*** 
 (0.063) (0.072) (0.062) (0.064) (0.067) (0.080) (0.059) (0.073)   ... x IAS-39 -0.183 -0.198 -0.189 -0.229 -0.155 -0.177 -0.146 -0.186 
 (0.202) (0.207) (0.199) (0.201) (0.200) (0.197) (0.205) (0.202)   ... x Crisis -0.006 -0.033 -0.006 -0.047 -0.044 -0.064 -0.077 -0.109 
 (0.089) (0.067) (0.090) (0.069) (0.086) (0.073) (0.084) (0.081) ǻLOSSt+2 0.433*** 0.442*** 0.438*** 0.450*** 0.427*** 0.461*** 0.421** 0.442*** 
 (0.147) (0.153) (0.141) (0.133) (0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.146)   ... x IAS-39 0.110 0.087 0.105 0.077 0.110 0.055 0.126 0.086 
 (0.164) (0.195) (0.166) (0.197) (0.165) (0.188) (0.172) (0.195)   ... x Crisis -0.368** -0.339** -0.371** -0.348** -0.337** -0.305** -0.315** -0.288** 
 (0.156) (0.147) (0.153) (0.138) (0.142) (0.126) (0.138) (0.123) EQBPt  -0.017***  -0.023***  -0.020***  -0.023*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)   ... x IAS-39  -0.003  -0.006  -0.010  -0.010 
  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)   ... x Crisis  0.011  0.017*  0.011  0.015 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) EBTPt   0.052 0.224**   0.057 0.192** 
   (0.096) (0.085)   (0.086) (0.077)   ... x IAS-39   0.017 -0.059   0.004 -0.061 
   (0.084) (0.122)   (0.116) (0.144)   ... x Crisis   -0.048 -0.144*   -0.203* -0.274** 
   (0.082) (0.079)   (0.108) (0.130) EBTPt+1     0.027 0.161 -0.022 0.029 
     (0.118) (0.106) (0.091) (0.094)   ... x IAS-39     -0.138 -0.181 -0.108 -0.107 
     (0.109) (0.149) (0.137) (0.154)   ... x Crisis     0.206 0.152 0.315 0.287 
     (0.198) (0.174) (0.220) (0.203) Obs. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R² 0.469 0.521 0.471 0.543 0.483 0.546 0.489 0.561 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Constant term was 
suppressed to save space.   
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The results also highlight that provisions are built more gradually after the crisis but not necessarily 
for banks that report under the IAS-39 standards. Indeed, the coefficient estimates for lagged 
endogenous variable (οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ) that is interacted with the crisis dummy variable are significant and 
remain consistently around 40% in all models, while the interaction with the IAs-39 has an opposite 
offsetting impact. In other words, in the post-crisis era, banks that have not been under IAS-39 
have generally built their loan loss reserves in a more gradual manner, while those under IAS-39 
have continued to operate similar to how they operated prior to the crisis. As noted above, these 
estimates may be biased due to inherent correlation of the lagged endogenous variable with the 
current error terms, which will be treated below.  
Perhaps the most striking finding that emerges from Table 3 is the relatively tight link between 
future write-offs and current provisioning levels. Indeed, banks appear to build-up reserves to 
absorb nearly 70% of their losses within one year and around 45% between first and second 
years29, although the latter relationship almost entirely disappears after the crisis. The sensitivity of 
current provisioning to future losses appears to be slightly weakened after the implementation of 
the IAS-39 standards, although the relationship is generally statistically significant except under the 
third column. Once again, it is important to note that the potential correlation between the forecast 
errors and the written-off losses due to the potential endogeneity of future losses and current 
provisioning may be biasing the results.  
There also appears to be a very strong and robust relationship between provisioning decisions and 
the level of equity before provisioning (ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ). This implies that banks that have a weak equity 
position tend to increase their provisioning levels. As noted above, weakly capitalized banks may 
be increasing their current provisioning to ensure that future losses do not lead to a further 
deterioration in capital levels, possibly under pressure from investors. The statistical significance 
may also be a part of the business model, in that less capitalized banks tend to provision more as 
they may be taking more risks.  
The evidence on the impact of earnings management and earnings signalling on provisioning 
decisions are relatively mixed. In particular, the coefficient estimates on current earnings (ܧܤܶ ௧ܲ) 
are significantly positive in only two model specifications (columns IV and VIII) and are insignificant 
when the net equity position before current retained earnings (ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ ) is left out of the model 
(columns III and VII).30 The results also show that the earnings levels matter less after the crisis. 
The coefficient estimates for the one-year forward earnings are not statistically significant in any 
model specification.  
It is possible that some of the OLS findings are due to the fact that bank-specific factors are not 
adequately taken into account. Indeed, the regressions may not be efficient if such factors are not 
adequately summarized by the bank-specific variables (eg. size, written-off losses, current and 
future earnings, and the capital measures) that are readily included in the regressions.   
  
                                                   
29 Note that by the construction of equation (1) and the equations that follow, the ߛଵ and ߛଶ determine the 
extent to which loan loss reserves are built to absorb the losses within the next two years. 
30 This result could also be due to the first degree autocorrelation, which is typical in earnings data.  
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Table 4. Fixed-effects (FE) panel regression results for ǻLLR(t) 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
IAS-39 -0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Crisis -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Bank size 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) GDP growth -0.023* -0.020 -0.024* -0.022* -0.024* -0.021 -0.025* -0.023* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) ST rate 0.051* 0.054** 0.051* 0.046* 0.031 0.034 0.031 0.029 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) 
LT spread 0.104** 0.107** 0.104** 0.103** 0.081* 0.085** 0.087* 0.089** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.043) (0.040) 
ǻLLRt-1 -0.008 -0.088 -0.010 -0.105 0.011 -0.064 0.019 -0.074 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.076) (0.059) (0.052) (0.064) (0.068)   ... x IAS-39 -0.070 -0.095 -0.052 -0.082 -0.040 -0.067 -0.029 -0.058 
 (0.145) (0.153) (0.125) (0.134) (0.142) (0.144) (0.113) (0.122) 
  ... x Crisis 0.010 0.135 -0.013 0.136* -0.040 0.080 -0.056 0.091 
 (0.167) (0.079) (0.171) (0.079) (0.165) (0.071) (0.159) (0.065) 
ǻLOSSt+1 0.963*** 0.971*** 0.980*** 1.002*** 0.961*** 0.966*** 0.989*** 1.008*** 
 (0.155) (0.163) (0.144) (0.155) (0.151) (0.159) (0.146) (0.156)   ... x IAS-39 -0.266 -0.217 -0.289* -0.242 -0.227 -0.187 -0.239 -0.198 
 (0.169) (0.163) (0.168) (0.165) (0.176) (0.168) (0.178) (0.173)   ... x Crisis -0.326** -0.367** -0.321** -0.384** -0.345** -0.379** -0.367** -0.421** 
 (0.133) (0.151) (0.131) (0.147) (0.138) (0.150) (0.150) (0.162) ǻLOSSt+2 0.712*** 0.658*** 0.713*** 0.664*** 0.725*** 0.680*** 0.710*** 0.657*** 
 (0.168) (0.172) (0.161) (0.156) (0.168) (0.174) (0.165) (0.169)   ... x IAS-39 -0.085 -0.024 -0.090 -0.004 -0.124 -0.063 -0.099 -0.013 
 (0.134) (0.174) (0.136) (0.182) (0.138) (0.174) (0.142) (0.186)   ... x Crisis -0.500*** -0.512*** -0.490*** -0.522*** -0.455*** -0.476*** -0.428*** -0.454*** 
 (0.150) (0.162) (0.153) (0.148) (0.129) (0.134) (0.127) (0.124) EQBPt 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.035* 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.033 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.020) 
  ... x IAS-39 
 
-0.043** 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.023 
  
(0.016) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
  ... x Crisis 
 
0.015 
 
0.022** 
 
0.015* 
 
0.021* 
  
(0.009) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.010) 
EBTPt 
  
0.160 0.279* 
  
0.167 0.285* 
   
(0.124) (0.148) 
  
(0.105) (0.165) 
  ... x IAS-39 
  
-0.132** -0.196 
  
-0.113 -0.177 
   
(0.059) (0.123) 
  
(0.078) (0.154) 
  ... x Crisis 
  
-0.069 -0.179* 
  
-0.184* -0.283* 
   
(0.080) (0.093) 
  
(0.095) (0.141) 
EBTPt+1 
    
0.174 0.177 0.098 0.078 
     
(0.182) (0.181) (0.150) (0.159) 
  ... x IAS-39 
    
-0.331** -0.297* -0.238 -0.189 
     
(0.160) (0.162) (0.155) (0.156) 
  ... x Crisis 
    
0.178 0.147 0.293 0.284 
     
(0.178) (0.157) (0.207) (0.196) 
Obs. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
Banks 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
R² (within) 0.564 0.589 0.573 0.609 0.586 0.607 0.596 0.629 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Constant term was 
suppressed to save space.   
Table 4 provides the results for the fixed-effects panel regressions in order to take account for the 
bank-specific results. Comparing these panel regressions to the pooled regressions in Table 3, we 
see that none of the statistically significant coefficient estimates change their signs. Also, the signs 
and the statistical significance of the macro-economic variables and the earnings variable (ܧܤܶ ௧ܲ ) 
remain virtually the same. Only the dummy variables for IAS-39 and crisis periods exhibit some 
statistically significant power, although not consistently so.  
Despite similarities, there are some key differences between the OLS and FE regressions. In 
particular, the lagged endogenous variable (οܮܮܴ௧ିଵ) is no longer a statistically significance 
explanatory variable, except under one model when it is interacted with the crisis dummy variable. 
Moreover, the statistical significance of the coefficients for equity levels (ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ) are much lower, 
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which gives support to the explanation that the level of capital may be related with bank-specific 
risk-taking.  
Another key difference relates to how future losses may be related to current provisioning 
decisions. According to the fixed-effect regression results, banks build reserves to absorb nearly all 
of their losses in the next period and about two-thirds of their losses beyond that period within two 
years. The sensitivities of current provisioning decisions to both the one- and two-year forward-
looking losses decline after the crisis.  
Some of these differences are likely to be a direct consequence of the inclusion of bank-specific 
fixed effects. In particular, the increased standard errors for the coefficient for ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ most likely 
imply that equity levels serve as a good proxy for time-invariant credit risk portfolio of each bank. It 
is nevertheless curious that the same has not happened for interaction terms between equity and 
the crisis dummy, or to that extent, to the IAS-39 dummy.  
Neither the OLS nor the FE panel regressions take into account the potential due correlation 
between the lagged endogenous variables and future losses and errors terms. Table 5 attempts to 
take account of these potential errors with the use of system generalized method-of-moments 
(SYS-GMM) estimation.  
Before delving into the results, it is important to assess two key statistical qualities of the SYS-
GMM estimations. First, the two tests for tests of over-identifying restrictions return a negative 
result. In particular, neither the Sargan or Hansen J-statistics tests can reject the null hypothesis 
that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Indeed, this outcome was partly assured by selecting 
the instruments that yielded the highest p-values for the two J-statistics.31 Second, despite the 
expectation that the error terms would be serially auto-correlated, the first- and second-degree 
tests for autocorrelation are rejected at the 10% significance level. These results are also striking 
since, beyond the inherent serial correlation of error terms arising from equation (5) above, the 
SYS-GMM estimations introduce an additional source of autocorrelation as they involve differenced 
equations (i.e.  ߝ௧ െ ߝ௧ିଵ  would be naturally correlated with ߝ௧ିଵ െ ߝ௧ିଶ).  
Turning to the comparison of the estimates reported in Table 5 with earlier regressions, GDP 
growth remains as the only statistically significant macro-economic factor while neither the short-
term interest rate nor the long-term spreads matter, despite the fact that the coefficient estimates 
have in almost all cases the expected signs. The crisis does not seem to have had any direct 
impact on provisioning, at least not statistically significantly so, but the introduction of IAS-39 might 
have weakly reduced the provisioning levels in general. Dynamic panel bias appears to be weakly 
present since unlike earlier regressions none of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. 
It is also interesting to note that most of the coefficient estimates remain with similar signs obtained 
in earlier studies.32  
  
                                                   
31 In the reported regressions, the models yielded the best results when the first lags of the house price index 
were used as the instrument for the lagged dependent variable and the changes in the unemployment rate 
and BEL20 stock market index was used as instruments for the forward-looking losses. 
32 Results that are not provided here confirm that the loss of significance is not due to the treatment of the 
endogeneity of the forward-looking losses. Indeed, the lagged dependent variables lose their significance 
when the difference-GMM approach is only used to treat the dynamic panel bias (eg. without using 
instruments for the forward-looking variables).  
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Table 5. SYS-GMM regression results for ǻLLR(t) 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
IAS-39 -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.003* -0.002 -0.003* -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Crisis -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Bank size 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) GDP growth -0.033* -0.035* -0.035* -0.036* -0.031* -0.033* -0.034* -0.034* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) ST rate 0.037 0.025 0.039 0.025 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.036) (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) 
LT spread 0.057 0.043 0.051 0.038 0.022 0.010 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.053) (0.041) (0.052) (0.045) (0.052) (0.048) 
ǻLLRt-1 -0.016 0.013 0.001 -0.009 0.025 0.060 0.061 0.035 
 (0.131) (0.115) (0.146) (0.087) (0.117) (0.121) (0.128) (0.097)   ... x IAS-39 0.043 -0.009 0.105 0.066 0.260 0.218 0.339 0.381 
 (0.205) (0.265) (0.232) (0.317) (0.210) (0.315) (0.233) (0.378) 
  ... x Crisis 0.004 -0.005 -0.092 -0.085 -0.236 -0.268 -0.409 -0.452 
 (0.277) (0.315) (0.322) (0.292) (0.296) (0.354) (0.349) (0.375) 
ǻLOSSt+1 1.588*** 1.528*** 1.583*** 1.435*** 1.390*** 1.291*** 1.392*** 1.226*** 
 (0.224) (0.198) (0.225) (0.196) (0.264) (0.204) (0.192) (0.224)   ... x IAS-39 -1.178*** -1.101*** -1.249*** -1.154*** -1.040* -0.995** -1.034** -1.040** 
 (0.437) (0.355) (0.452) (0.366) (0.596) (0.438) (0.524) (0.438)   ... x Crisis 0.021 -0.015 0.120 0.171 0.118 0.153 0.132 0.325 
 (0.477) (0.526) (0.514) (0.512) (0.486) (0.529) (0.488) (0.511) ǻLOSSt+2 1.608** 1.720*** 1.718** 1.745*** 1.509*** 1.661*** 1.655*** 1.652*** 
 (0.660) (0.622) (0.804) (0.553) (0.448) (0.434) (0.531) (0.393)   ... x IAS-39 -0.858*** -0.845*** -0.944*** -0.933*** -0.886** -0.889*** -0.947** -0.989*** 
 (0.307) (0.267) (0.334) (0.274) (0.416) (0.331) (0.386) (0.353)   ... x Crisis -0.549 -0.705 -0.587 -0.655 -0.304 -0.485 -0.446 -0.391 
 (0.762) (0.568) (0.845) (0.525) (0.486) (0.411) (0.601) (0.401) EQBPt  -0.019  -0.026  -0.003  -0.000 
  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.021)   ... x IAS-39  0.035  0.035  0.032  0.024 
  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.033)   ... x Crisis  -0.001  0.011  0.001  0.018 
  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.018) EBTPt   0.367** 0.407***   0.588*** 0.656** 
   (0.160) (0.145)   (0.218) (0.290)   ... x IAS-39   -0.077 -0.171   -0.186 -0.254 
   (0.242) (0.243)   (0.206) (0.226)   ... x Crisis   -0.088 -0.089   0.008 -0.015 
   (0.203) (0.168)   (0.188) (0.173) EBTPt+1     0.220 0.244 0.488* 0.551* 
     (0.144) (0.161) (0.260) (0.293)   ... x IAS-39     -0.308 -0.326 -0.492* -0.556* 
     (0.224) (0.225) (0.267) (0.293)   ... x Crisis     0.418 0.379 0.385 0.354 
     (0.403) (0.420) (0.340) (0.401) Obs. 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
Banks 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Hansen p-val 0.999 1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sargan p-val 0.850 0.842 0.883 0.823 0.912 0.909 0.978 0.978 
AR(1) p-val 0.312 0.192 0.386 0.157 0.290 0.113 0.625 0.340 
AR(2) p-val 0.474 0.734 0.240 0.892 0.548 0.752 0.250 0.709 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Constant term was 
suppressed to save space.  The dynamic panel bias due to the potential correlation of ǻLLRt-1 with the error 
terms, including the interaction terms, was addressed by using the second and third lags of lagged dependent 
variable, all the exogenous variables, as well as the first lag of the house price index as instruments. The 
correlation of the forward-looking loss variables (ǻLOSSt+1 and ǻLOSSt+2) and the interaction terms with the 
forecast errors was addressed by using third and fourth lags of each relevant variable, the exogenous 
variables, as well as the change in unemployment and BEL20 stock market indices as instruments. The 
lagged instruments were only used in the first difference equations in system GMM regressions. All 
regressions follow Roodman (2009) in collapsing the instrument matrix. The Sargan and Hansen tests report 
the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity, which are not rejected in any model. The values 
reported for AR(1) and AR(2) are the p-values for the first and second order auto-correlated disturbances. 
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Perhaps the most striking difference between the SYS-GMM regressions and the earlier results 
relate to the forward-looking loss components. In particular, the coefficient estimates for the 
forward-looking losses are much greater, with banks provisioning more than their expected losses 
in these periods. Perhaps more interestingly, this strong sensitivity of current provisioning decisions 
to future losses weakens considerably after the introduction of the IAS-39 standards. In particular, 
the introduction of the IAS-39 standards appears to have made current provisioning levels almost 
entirely insensitive to one-year forward looking loss estimates and much less sensitive to two-year 
forward looking losses. As in prior regressions, the crisis has also had a similar impact, although 
not statistically significant.  
Moving beyond the forward-looking losses, the coefficient estimates for current equity levels 
(ܧܳܤ ௧ܲ) are not statistically significant. As argued above for the FE regressions, this decreased the 
explanatory power of equity levels is most likely due to the time-invariant relationship between 
equity levels and risk-taking, which is taken into account by differencing the equation. Unlike prior 
regressions, the coefficient estimates on current earnings (ܧܤܶ ௧ܲ ) are not only significantly positive 
but also consistent across different models. Moreover, the coefficient estimates for the IAS-39 
interaction variable (ܧܤܶܲ × IAS-39௧) are also unequivocally negative, although not highly 
significant. Another alternative motivator of provisioning, the signalling of future earnings, is weakly 
present but appears to have disappeared after the implementation of the IAS-39 standards.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
The key finding of the paper is that current provisioning decisions of Belgian banks appear to be 
strongly linked to forward-looking loan losses. Our results show that the link has considerably 
weakened with the introduction of the IAS-39 standards. This implies that the introduction of these 
accounting standards have effectively made provisioning decisions more backward-looking, at least 
as far as one could assess using the BGAAP-based unconsolidated supervisory reporting. It is 
possible that the Belgian banks have changed their loss recognition procedures amidst the 
financial crisis, which has overlapped with the introduction of the IAS-39 standards as well as other 
standards.33 Our results lend some support to that possibility, although the estimates are not 
consistently statistically significant across different empirical models.  
Apart from the importance of forward-looking losses, three results emerge from the study. First, 
although provisioning policies are strongly correlated with capital levels, this relationship weakens 
considerably once bank-specific time-invariant factors are accounted for. Thus, although 
undercapitalized banks may face higher credit risks -- and may thus require more provisioning -- 
this relationship seems to be related to the business model of each bank rather than the conditions 
in the credit market. Second, once the bank-specific factors and the endogeneity problems are 
addressed, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between provisioning and net 
earnings levels. This finding suggests that earnings management could be at play, implying that 
banks are strategically increasing or decreasing their provisioning levels to smooth their earnings. 
The introduction of the IAS-39 standards appears to have weakened the importance of this factor, 
but only mildly so since the coefficient estimates for the relevant factors are not statistically 
significant. Third, a similar – albeit much weaker – relationship is also present between the current 
provisioning levels and future net earnings. Thus, earnings signalling might also be present, 
although the introduction of the IAS-39 standards also weakens this relationship.  
The findings underline two distinct issues that could have policy relevance. First, the introduction of 
the IFRS-9 rules is likely to change how Belgian banks provision for their future losses. However, 
judging by the pre-IAS 39 results, this would in some sense represent a déjà vu, at least for some 
banks. Second, earnings management motives appear to be present for Belgian banks, before and 
after the introduction of the IAS-39 rules. Once again, supervisors may need to monitor closely 
whether earnings management continues to be a potential motivating factor after the introduction of 
the IFRS-9 rules.  
Future research might focus on a number of issues that have not been addressed in this paper. 
Since the aim of this paper was to primarily focus on the provisioning policies, a complementary 
assessment of whether Belgian banks delayed loss recognition was not made here, which could be 
topic of future research.34 Moreover, the paper relies entirely on supervisory reports that are 
prepared under the BGAAP standard. A parallel reporting is also available for consolidated entities 
since 2005 that is entirely based on the IAS-39 standard and uses the non-performing loan criteria 
set forth under the Basel II rules. This database could be used to dig deeper into the loss-
recognition policies of Belgian banks with the help of such an “objective measure” of asset quality.  
  
                                                   
33 Such a development has been observed in some of the Eurozone economies that have faced substantial 
worsening of asset quality, (Aiyar et al., 2015; Jassaud & Kang, 2015). 
34 A particularly complicating factor that makes the analysis more difficult here is that Belgian banks have 
started using an “objective” criteria for non-performing loans (eg. based on number of days of non-
payment) only recently. This makes the assessment of loss recognition quite difficult, at least for the period 
considered in this paper.  
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